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Abstract
The transition to a low-carbon economy will entail a large-scale structural
change. Some industries will have to expand their relative economic weight,
while other industries, especially those directly linked to fossil fuel production
and consumption, will have to decline. Such a systemic shift may have major
repercussions on the stability of financial systems, via abrupt asset revalua-
tions, defaults on debt, and the creation of bubbles in rising industries. Studies
on previous industrial transitions have shed light on the financial transition
risks originating from rapidly rising “sunrise” industries. In contrast, a similar
conceptual understanding of risks from declining “sunset” industries is cur-
rently lacking. We substantiate this claim with a critical review of the concep-
tual and historical literature, which also shows that most literature either
examines structural change in the real economy, or risks to financial stability,
but rarely both together. We contribute to filling this research gap by develop-
ing a consistent theoretical framework of the drivers, transmission channels,
and impacts of the phase-out of carbon-intensive industries on the financial
system and on the feedback from the financial system into the rest of the econ-
omy. We also review the state of play of policy aiming to protect the financial
system from transition risks and spell out research implications.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Climate change mitigation requires the rapid decarbonization of the economy. Climate change is already threatening soci-
ety through altered patterns of extreme weather events and through impacts on critical ecosystems. The best climate pro-
jections to date indicate that catastrophic impacts could arise in the near future from nonlinear effects leading to
“tipping-points” in the Earth system, such as the collapse of ice sheets or tropical rainforests (Lenton et al., 2008, 2019).
The 2015 Paris agreement enshrines the need to avoid such consequences with a goal of stabilizing temperature increases
well below 2C above pre-industrial levels, with the aim of limiting negative climate change impacts at manageable levels,
although substantial climate variability would still remain (Holden et al., 2018). To avoid warming of the global average
temperature exceeding 1.5C, evidence gathered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change suggests that
decreasing net carbon emissions to zero by mid-century is likely to be necessary (IPCC, 2018). Consequently, governments
and sub-national entities have started adopting laws requiring carbon neutrality by or before mid-century.
Decarbonizing the economy quickly is not trivial. It will involve large-scale structural change, with some sectors
having to rapidly expand their relative production/market shares, and others having to entirely transform their techno-
logical basis or, alternatively, shrink and potentially disappear. This last category of sectors comprises activities directly
related to the extraction and distribution of fossil fuels, but also, and perhaps most importantly because it implicates a
far larger proportion of the economy, sectors producing goods and services using fossil fuels as a crucial input in their
production process. In some cases, such as power production, a low-carbon alternative is available that is increasingly
competitive with the incumbent (Lazard, 2019). Increasing electrification of end-use technologies, such as passenger
transport, also points toward promising paths for decarbonization (IEA, 2019). But in other industries, such as steel or
air travel, development is only at an early stage, and a significant proportion of firms still lack a strategic plan to face
the low-carbon transition (Dietz et al., 2020).
A fast transformation of economic structure is likely to have significant financial impacts. A lively debate has been
developing around the threats of a low-carbon transition for the stability of financial institutions, and for the financial
system as a whole. While there has been a rapid expansion of concepts and evidence concerning transition risks from
academia, private industry, and regulators (e.g., Bolton, Despres, Pereira Da Silva, Samama, & Svartzman, 2020;
NGFS, 2019), a comprehensive theoretical framework linking the low-carbon structural change to financial dynamics is
still missing. It is not yet clear what the risk drivers, sectoral origins and transmission channels will be, or how their
effects will propagate to the wider macroeconomy.
The aim of this article is to shed some light on how risks for financial stability relate to the transition's underlying
structural change. First, we survey the literature for insights on the general links between structural change and
finance. The low-carbon transition is certainly not the first systemic technological shift in recent history, and several
authors have discussed the issue of how these shifts are linked to finance (Freeman & Louca, 2001; Perez, 1983;
Schumpeter, 1939). We find that the overwhelming majority of this literature has focused on how financial risks
develop in sunrise industries, that is, the rising sectors, where bubbles could develop and then burst, with detrimental
impacts on wider society.
Turning to the low-carbon transition, we notice how, contrary to this historical perspective, most of the current
debate on transition-related financial risks focuses on the risks developing in sunset industries (carbon-intensive ones,
in this case). For instance, a widespread preoccupation concerns the financial repercussions of asset stranding, that is,
the unexpected devaluation or write-off of assets from the balance sheets of economic agents (Caldecott, 2018; van der
Ploeg & Rezai, 2019). The “focus shift” between past literature on transitions and the current debate leaves us without a
well-defined comprehensive framework to understand and address how low-carbon transition financial risks develop in
sunset sectors and interact with those in sunrise industries.
To advance the debate and contribute to filling this conceptual gap, we develop a minimal but consistent framework
of low-carbon transition risks for finance. We distinguish: (a) drivers of transition risks; (b) the economic costs that the
transition could impose on non-financial agents in terms of loss of income and asset stranding; (c) the impacts that
these costs would create on financial institutions and financial stability, in terms of non-performing loans, loss in port-
folio values and higher expenditures; and (d) the wider macroeconomic effects leading to a loss of aggregate demand
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and recession. Finally, we outline and comment on the current state of policies pursued by central banks and other
actors seeking to stabilize the financial system without interfering with the transition itself, in the fast-evolving policy
community on climate-related financial risks.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic literature linking structural
change, innovation, and finance. Section 3 focuses on the ongoing debate around the risks of a low-carbon transition.
Section 4 presents our conceptual framework on transition risks for finance. Section 5 discusses actual and possible pol-
icies aimed at mitigating transition risks. Section 6 concludes with potential research avenues.
2 | THREATS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY FROM THE RISE AND FALL OF
INDUSTRIES
For the purposes of analyzing transition risks to finance, we define the low-carbon transition as structural economic change:
some parts of the economy grow and others decline in relative importance, as a result of deliberate policy, changing prefer-
ences, and ongoing technological change (Syrquin, 2010).1 To meet emissions-reduction targets, low-carbon sunrise indus-
tries must grow rapidly, while high-carbon sunset industries must decline rapidly. This process can precipitate and interact
with other structural changes in the economy (Ciarli & Savona, 2019). Low-carbon transition risks for finance can then be
defined as the threat to financial stability from this specific type of (rapid) structural change. For a conceptual understanding
of this relation, we turn to the literature on financial crises and on innovation as the process underlying structural change.
2.1 | Finance and innovation: A neglected subfield
At the outset, it is important to note the relative conceptual neglect of the problem. Scholars studying financial crises
rarely venture into the details of technological change, but focus on aggregate fluctuations. Kindleberger (1978), the
classic reference on historical financial crises, eschews the details of the technical change that underlies several of his
documented financial manias. The only technological change Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) refer to is the financial inno-
vation of changing from coin to paper money. Similarly, innovation scholarship, which studies structural change due to
technological and behavioral change, tends to omit systemic financial aspects; recent exceptions are Callegari (2018)
and Geddes and Schmidt (2020). Even students of “financing innovation” tend to adopt a microeconomic perspective
on how market failures prevent a small set of innovative firms from getting enough funding (Hall & Lerner, 2010), but
neglect innovation's interaction with financial stability. If anything, research in this area considers the opposite direc-
tion of causation, that is, how the 2007–2008 financial crisis and subsequent stimuli have affected innovation (Giebel &
Kraft, 2019; Mundaca & Richter, 2015).
Multisectoral theories of technological change lie in the small intersection of these two fields. Perhaps the oldest such
program of continued relevance is to be found in Marxist crisis theories (Basu, 2018; Shaikh, 1978), building on Karl
Marx's unique attention to technology as explaining social change (Rosenberg, 1982). Marx's differentiation of the econ-
omy into sectors producing capital and consumption goods (departments 1 and 2) allows for both underconsumption
(Sweezy, 1970) and over-investment (Brenner, 2006) to generate a crisis. But existing Marxist literature tends to disregard
industries within departments: both low-carbon and high-carbon industries are subsumed in each department.
Real business cycle theory models (negative) shocks from technological change in multi-sectoral settings
(Davis, 1987). But technology shocks are typically random, not linked to secularly declining or rising industries
(Azariadis & Kaas, 2016). Moreover, integrating a meaningful financial sector into these models would require major
changes to the theoretical framework (Stiglitz, 2018). The only theoretical approach placing the interaction of finance
and structural change front and center appears to be the Schumpeterian one.2
2.2 | The Schumpeterian perspective
In the Schumpeterian theory of the business cycle, innovative agents (entrepreneurs) create new clusters of vastly more
productive technologies, collectively cause socio-technical transitions, and generate structural change through “creative
destruction” of less competitive products and industries.3 Examples, where this theory applies, include railway transport
and steam shipping, based on steam engine diffusion, replacing canal and sailing ship transport in the second half of the
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19th century; the internal combustion engine based on oil displacing steam-powered transport in the early 20th century
(Freeman & Perez, 1988); or more recently electronics revolutionizing data processing (Mowery & Rosenberg, 1998).
The financial sector and specifically banks play a crucial role in enabling entrepreneurs to finance their new enter-
prises by creating credit (Schumpeter, 1939). Only with the support of financial institutions can entrepreneurs acquire
the resources for executing their innovative plans and creating sunrise industries. While the credit creation function of
banks is key to innovation and leads to output expansion in a “primary wave”, the increasingly profitable sunrise indus-
tries become objects of financial speculation. This “secondary wave” of the business cycle risks overestimating sunrise
industries’ growth potential (Schumpeter, 1939). Over-indebtedness and defaults can result from the exhaustion of an
innovation cluster, and generate a financial crisis. One instance that this theory can explain is the 1929 financial crisis,
which involved a bubble in radio, electricity, airplanes, automobile, and petrochemical industries (Freeman &
Louca, 2001). Similarly, the investment booms for the expansion of railways in the 19th century were at the root of
financial crises in several countries in the mid-1800s (Vague, 2019), and the 2001 “dotcom” bubble burst even carries a
sunrise industry's name. In practice, the distinction between speculative and conventional investment may be partly
artificial, the key being a miscalculation of risk that is only revealed retrospectively. Nevertheless, these examples illus-
trate the link between structural change and transition risks for the financial sector.
In Schumpeter's theory, the origin of these risks lies in sunrise industries. Uncertainty about what technological
design will ultimately prevail and about the scale at which the growing industry saturates, creates the potential for spec-
ulation and over-investment that have been characterized as manias (Kindleberger, 1978) and irrational exuberance
(Shiller, 2001). Once the bubble bursts, and the financial crisis starts, it can be exacerbated by the failure of financially
unstable sunset firms. However, the theory largely ignores the contribution of sunset industries to the development of
financial instability, and Schumpeter (1939) explicitly states that the negative effects of bankruptcy and decline in the
sunset industries is overcompensated by the growth in the new industries. In other words, as long as growth opportuni-
ties in the sunrise sector exist, systemic economic and financial stability are not compromised by a failing sunset sector.
This does not preclude sunset capital owners from losing their investments during periods of “structural crises of adjust-
ment” that also spell unemployment and decline in living standards for a significant share of the population
(Freeman & Louca, 2001). A recent example relevant to the low-carbon transition is the layoffs and declines in living-
standards in coal-mining communities catalyzing demands for a “just transition” (Rosemberg, 2010).
Subsequent work by Schumpeterian scholars emphasizes the important role of government policy and social change
in the assimilation of new technologies, which was assumed to happen automatically by Schumpeter (Freeman &
Louca, 2001; Perez, 1983). The role of finance in these technological revolutions that change the “techno-economic par-
adigm” is developed by Carlota Perez (2002). Her work highlights how the aftermath of the financial collapse that
marks the end of the initial speculation with sunrise industry reveals the social problems resulting from the changes
and generates anger, revolt, and populism. A new set of regulations and institutions are needed at this turning point to
establish a direction for innovation and investment, spreading the new technologies in socially beneficial ways.4 An
important take-home message from this literature is the role of government in regulating and managing economic
instability arising from structural change.
Technology-based financial instability can also be seen as a case of Minsky's (1975, 1986) financial instability
hypothesis, which describes how the financial sector continuously drives itself toward financial crises through the crea-
tion of increasingly complex financial structures, the accumulation of debt and financial innovation (recent discussions
include Nikolaidi & Stockhammer, 2017; Taylor, 2012). Although innovation and technological change are exogenous
in Minsky, his understanding of the relation of profit opportunities and financial speculation adds important insights to
transition risks stemming from the fast development of rising industries.
2.3 | Risks associated with sunset industries
To the best of our knowledge, to date, there is little theory that explains financial instability caused by sunset industries.
The Schumpeterian literature locates the crisis mechanism in the sunrise industries, while the contribution to financial
risks from declining industries is left largely unexplored. Caiani, Godin, and Lucarelli (2014) show that systemic risk from
sunset industries can be shown mathematically to cause economic distress, but more theoretical effort is needed to deter-
mine under what conditions asset scrapping can trigger a financial crisis. The slightly neglected work by Szostack (1995)
demonstrates that process innovations in sunset sectors combined with a lack of new product innovations can explain ris-
ing unemployment in the Great Depression, but stops short of linking this account to the financial collapse.
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The 1930s and 1940s see the discussion of the microeconomic problem of “premature abandonment”, an earlier term
for asset stranding (Caplan, 1940). This literature is related to vintage capital models of growth and fluctuations, which
remain somewhat disconnected from financial stability (see, e.g., Benhabib & Hobijn, 2003). A neo-Schumpeterian vin-
tage capital model allows for costly reallocation of factors of production between industries, but has not analyzed under
what conditions such reallocation could destabilize the financial system (Caballero & Hammour, 1996).
Institutional economic history of the secular decline of the British economy offers a different lens on the contribu-
tion of sunset industries to financial risks. Individual industries, such as cotton or steel suffered from chronic overca-
pacity after 1920, and government programs were instituted to scrap uncompetitive machines to reduce capacity
(Lazonick, 1984; Tolliday, 1987). Banks that had lent during the uptick of domestic demand in 1919–1920 found them-
selves in a precarious position in the subsequently stagnating British economy. But the focus of this literature is again
on the reverse causal direction, namely to investigate how the nature of the British financial system influenced British
manufacturing industries’ decline, not how decline of specific industries contributed to vulnerabilities in the financial
sector (Best & Humphries, 1984; Higgins & Toms, 2003).
In summary, economic theorists and historians have identified sunrise industry speculation as the trigger of finan-
cial crises, but have not substantially investigated systemic risks originating in sunset industries, even though it is rec-
ognized that the latter may contribute to the severity of the crisis once it is unleashed. Our conceptual review offers an
important insight for the current low-carbon transition. An industry with declining demand generates losses for its
owners, unemployment for its employees, and quite possibly a default on its loans. However, theory suggests this is not
enough to destabilize the economy and induce systemic financial instability. The underlying logic argues that while
some companies and even financial institutions go under, the financial system as a whole is diversified and profitable
enough to weather this shock thanks to the dynamic sunrise industries. It is only when the sunrise industries mature,
and a bubble in their financial assets pops, that theory predicts the onset of crisis.
3 | LOW-CARBON TRANSITION RISKS FROM SUNSET INDUSTRIES
In contrast with what has just been reviewed, the current debate on the low-carbon transition has so far focused
on financial risk from sunset industries. The simple reason is that to achieve the Paris agreement targets, many
currently productive enterprises have to radically alter their production. In particular, a good share of the emis-
sions from currently known fossil fuel reserves must be suppressed (Carbon Tracker, 2013; McGlade &
Ekins, 2015; Meinshausen et al., 2009). The cash flow of industries supplying or using fossil fuels would be
impacted. If this impact is unanticipated by investors, their assets would prematurely depreciate or “strand”
(Caldecott, 2018), and if the stranding is widespread enough, it could engender financial instability and crisis
(Monasterolo, 2020; van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2019).
Consideration of sunrise industry risks, on the other hand, is absent from the debate. While observer bias and timing
may help explain some of this neglect (for instance, before the 2007–2008 crash few commentators pointed to a looming
housing crisis), there is also some hard evidence to cite: investment in low-carbon technologies has been increasing in recent
decades, but it is still far away from the scale necessary to compensate for the phase-out of fossil-based technologies under a
1.5C scenario (CPI, 2019; McCollum et al., 2018; Semieniuk & Mazzucato, 2019). Nor are the investments yet expected to
be vastly more profitable—support policies have so far been required to attract private investors even in the advanced power
supply sector (Mazzucato & Semieniuk, 2018; Polzin, Egli, Steffen, & Schmidt, 2019). Of course, the fast market capitaliza-
tion growth in some low-carbon companies such as Ørsted, market leader in offshore wind projects, or Tesla, an electric car
maker, are examples of (so-far) successful sunrise companies to point to (Financial Times, 2020a, 2020b). And there have
already been instances of initially hyped low-carbon companies collapsing just as if their potential had been overestimated
by Schumpeterian speculators, including photovoltaic cell makers Solarworld in Germany and Solyndra in the
US. However, these instances hardly triggered systemic financial instability, just as the burst of the YieldCo bubble in the US
in 2015 (which saw share prices drop by 60%) did not destabilize wider stock markets (CPI, 2016). In short, at this moment,
there does not yet seem to be a general “mania” in the low-carbon sunrise industries.
The timeline and scale of structural change implied by proposed climate-change mitigation then appears to make
this transition different. The aim is to correct an externality using deliberate policy intervention (Foley, 2009), rather
than to let a more or less evolutionary trajectory guide the transition. Past theory does caution that, if the transition is
managed well and innovation in low-carbon technologies is fast, then the world might soon find itself in the “typical”
situation whereby there are fast-growing low-carbon sunrise industries, that pose the risk of a “green bubble”.5
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However, the current debate suggests that such a sunrise industry-induced financial instability, if it materializes, may
be preceded by and interact with systemic risks realized in sunset industries.
4 | A MODEL AND CLASSIFICATION OF LOW-CARBON TRANSITION
RISKS
So far, we have established that mechanisms causing risks for finance from new industries are fairly well understood
conceptually, but the contrary is true of declining industries. Conversely, attention in the low-carbon transition is on
sunset industries, but sunrise industries are largely ignored. To improve an understanding of possible channels whereby
risks are transmitted from both sets of industries, we classify them to identify the drivers, costs, and impacts and their
logical connection via transmission channels. The summary of the logical argument is mapped in Figure 1. We review
evidence for each of these as we describe them.
4.1 | Transition risk drivers
Transition risk drivers (Figure 1, box 1) create economic costs and financial impacts via changing relative prices or mar-
ket demand/supply in favor of low-carbon goods and services, either immediately or over time. In the latter case,
FIGURE 1 Schematic view of chain of causation from risk drivers to impacts (boxes) via transmission channels (arrows)
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expectations about future changes may still create risks in the present (van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2020). Most drivers affect
sunset industries negatively, for example, by altering relative prices in favor of low-carbon products. By implication they
affect sunrise industries and expectations about them positively, so could drive—at least in the medium-term—sunrise
risk from speculation, too. Key drivers are climate change mitigation policy, technological change, and changes in con-
sumer taste (PRA, 2015). These are reviewed in turn as follows.
4.1.1 | Climate change mitigation policies
Policy seeking to internalize the carbon externality is a key driver of risks. The central plank of most climate change mitiga-
tion strategies consists of incentive-based regulation that prices carbon either via taxes or cap-and-trade schemes. The suite
of scenarios limiting global warming to 1.5C in the recent IPCC (2018) assessment reports a median global carbon price of
$91/tCO2 (metric ton of CO2) in 2025 and $179/tCO2 in 2030, with the interquartile range reaching up to $175/tCO2 and
$361/tCO2 respectively (calculations based on Huppmann et al., 2018). In April 2019, only 20% of global greenhouse gas
emissions were priced at all, and less than 5% of these were in line with Paris Agreement compatible levels (World
Bank, 2019). Effective mitigation policies could therefore drastically increase industry and consumer prices for high-carbon
products in the near future. Regulation may also directly limit the sale of high-carbon products. Ten countries have recently
set specific times for bans on new internal combustion engine cars, some as soon as 2030 (Meckling & Nahm, 2019).
In addition, public subsidies, regulations, and investments help lower prices of low-carbon products. Comprehen-
sive policy approaches for “green growth” such as China's 13th Five-Year Plan (National Development and Reform
Commission, 2016) or Europe's Green Deal (European Commission, 2019), include mandating, subsidizing, or directly
carrying out investments into low-carbon products and installing enabling infrastructure. This makes low-carbon prod-
ucts more competitive by creating markets, financing, and helping innovation proceed at pace or simply altering prices
directly (Block & Keller, 2011; Mazzucato & Semieniuk, 2017). Some policies such as differentiated prudential require-
ments, lending quotas, or targeted refinancing lines by the central bank regulate the financial sector directly
(Campiglio et al., 2018; Volz, 2017). It is important not to confuse the policy here seeking to accelerate the transition
(mitigation policy) with policy aimed at stabilizing the financial system, which we review in the next section.
4.1.2 | Technological change
Cost-saving technological innovations, possibly incentivized by earlier climate policies, further lower the prices of low-
carbon technologies (Kavlak, McNerney, & Trancik, 2018; Nemet, 2019). This is a nonlinear process often approximated
by s-curves of adoption (Rogers, 2003). The cheaper a new technology becomes, the more widely it is used, and through
scale and learning effects becomes even cheaper, until it emerges as the “new normal” (Arthur, 1989), altering the tech-
nological paradigm (Dosi, 1982). Structural change between technologies and the change in the ratio of relative demand
can thus accelerate over time, which has led to underestimating the rate of adoption of low-carbon technologies
(Creutzig et al., 2017). Since technology diffusion self-reinforces and evolves endogenously, once set in train, it can con-
tribute substantially to price changes even without any new policy changes. As a new socio-technical regime gradually
establishes itself, it requires decreasing amounts of external support to diffuse further (Geels, 2002). Technological tra-
jectories can also influence policy by opening up policy space through newly affordable alternatives (Schmidt &
Sewerin, 2017) and closing it down through path dependencies (Fouquet, 2016). Conversely, of course, policies and the
politics behind them influence which technologies are developed and deployed (Stirling, 2014).
4.1.3 | Preference change
Buyers’ preferences can drive demand and prices. Preferences are endogenous to institutions and their changes
(Bowles, 1998) and as more people use a technology, network effects may accelerate further adoption (McShane,
Bradlow, & Berger, 2012; Pettifor, Wilson, Axsen, Abrahamse, & Anable, 2017). Through their demand-pull effect, pref-
erences can also affect the pace and direction of technological change, which can interact with government procure-
ment policies (Boon & Edler, 2018). Moving beyond private consumption choices, preference changes can stir political
movements, putting broader pressure on policy making and changing what is politically feasible.6 The public
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mobilization against nuclear fission provides a cautionary story for other technologies (Boudet, 2019). Therefore,
changes in preferences can lead both to price changes and quantity restrictions.
4.2 | Transition costs
Transition drivers translate into transition costs (Figure 1, box 2) via two transmission channels (Figure 1, arrow A).
Price and quantity changes lead to adjustments in all sectors, affecting revenues of producers, the real income of house-
holds via unemployment and loss of earnings on investment, and state tax and state-owned enterprise revenue. Fossil
fuel price changes can be complex (Box 1). But importantly, the drivers also operate via expectations about future reve-
nue streams, especially if policy and preference changes are credible and long-lasting (Helm, Hepburn, & Mash, 2003).
This is not guaranteed, for example, some of the car bans discussed above lack credible enforcement mechanisms
(Plötz, Axsen, Funke, & Gnann, 2019), and current Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris agreement
are subject to uncertainty concerning their implementation (den Elzen et al., 2019; Pauw, Castro, Pickering, &
Bhasin, 2019). However, if expectations change, asset stranding can occur.7
4.2.1 | Physical asset stranding
A growing literature analyses high-carbon physical assets at risk of stranding. The risk that excess reserves of fossil-fuel
companies pose for their valuation was briefly reviewed in Section 3. The inconsistency that arises between the valua-
tion of these resources by fossil-fuel companies, and the valuation consistent with climate change mitigation is dis-
cussed by Bebbington, Schneider, Stevenson, and Fox (2019).9 Davis, Caldeira, and Matthews (2010) calculate that
existing fossil-fuel sector assets in 2009 would emit about 500 Gt of CO2, or about half the carbon budget then
remaining. These assessments have since been refined for fossil electricity assets and show an increasingly slim oppor-
tunity for new-build non-stranded assets (Davis & Socolow, 2014; Johnson et al., 2015; Pfeiffer, Hepburn, Vogt-Schilb, &
Caldecott, 2018; Tong et al., 2019). Yet, uncertainty remains: Rozenberg, Davis, Narloch, and Hallegatte (2015) calculate
that for a 2C warming scenario any fossil fuel asset built after 2017 cannot start operating if existing assets are priori-
tized and the carbon budget is to be respected. Meanwhile, Smith et al. (2019) find that current fossil fuel infrastructure
does not yet commit the world to warm beyond 1.5C. Part of this range arises from the uncertainty about the size of
the carbon budget itself (Rogelj, Forster, Kriegler, Smith, & Séférian, 2019).
Asset stranding can spill out of the fossil energy sector. Considering the relevance of fossil fuels as inputs in mining and
manufacturing processes, which then provide crucial intermediate inputs to downstream sectors, stranding of physical assets
could occur virtually anywhere in the economy. Cahen-Fourot, Campiglio, Dawkins, Godin, and Kemp-Benedict (2019)
show how moving away from fossil fuels as input factors could create significant “cascades” of asset stranding across the
production network of European economies. In the building sector (including residential housing), retrofitting costs may
exceed private returns (Fowlie, Greenstone, & Wolfram, 2018; Muldoon-Smith & Greenhalgh, 2019), and IRENA (2017) pro-
jects the building sector to hold the most stranded assets. Unruh (2000) coined the term “carbon lock-in”. In short, both land
and produced capital inputs can become stranded.
BOX 1 The effect of a carbon price on fossil fuel prices
A price on carbon is likely to have two opposite effects on fossil fuel prices. In the short run, consumer prices
will rise as firms pass costs on to consumers, lowering demand, while producers earn less revenue per unit sold,
a typical consequence of a tax increase in a partial equilibrium setting. In the long run, cheaper low-carbon sub-
stitutes could induce an accelerated structural change away from fossil fuels, which could lower prices due to
lack of demand and oversupply. If fossil fuel producers expect demand not to recover in the long run, they
might decide to flood the market in the short-run in a race to the bottom, to sell whatever they can
(Sinn, 2008).8 This can also have consequences for the distribution of stranded assets, as lower-cost producers
capture what is left of the declining market (Mercure et al., 2018).
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Research has been conducted on systematically valuing the loss of assets due to stranding. Mercure et al. (2018) esti-
mate losses of $1 tn–$4 tn in the fossil fuel sector in the period 2016–2035 under various scenarios including the current
trajectory of low-carbon technology without additional policy measures, while $0.957 tn of power sector asset stranding
up to 2050 was found in a bottom-up assessment by Saygin, Rigter, Caldecott, Wagner, and Gielen (2019). One of the
most cited works in this area is in the gray literature: for the IEA's Below 2 Degree scenario, Carbon Tracker and
UNPRI estimate one-third of business as usual investments into oil and gas, or $1.6tn, would be stranded in the period
2018–2025 (Carbon Tracker & UNPRI, 2018). IRENA (2017) calculates an economy-wide $10 tn stranded over the
period 2015–2050, which increases to $20 tn in a scenario of delayed transition policies. Dietz, Bowen, Dixon, and
Gradwell (2016) calculate value at risk from the transition to be 0.4% of global financial assets, or $0.6 tn. Recent analyt-
ical models show how, depending on the type and stringency of the policy implemented, some asset stranding in the
form of under-utilization of installed capital is not only likely, but also optimal from a social perspective (Coulomb,
Lecuyer, & Vogt-Schilb, 2019; Rozenberg, Vogt-Schilb, & Hallegatte, 2018). None of these studies model the impact of
asset stranding on the financial sector.
4.2.2 | Other transition costs
Along with asset stranding, workers could also become “stranded.” Although net aggregate job changes in a rapid
transition could be positive even in large-scale fossil fuel producing countries, high-carbon sectors are likely to suffer
from significant unemployment (Bastidas & Mc Isaac, 2019; Pollin, 2015). Without stabilizing government policy, high-
cost fossil fuel producers could even lose up to 3% (USA) and 8% (Canada) of employment (Mercure et al., 2018), when
including multiplier and knock-on effects of income and spending changes across the economy. As reviewed in Sec-
tion 2, transitional unemployment is well documented for structural change; moreover, stranded workers may not be
easily re-employed (Heim, 1984). A fast-growing policy literature considers prospects and costs for retraining workers
to ensure a “just transition” (ILO, 2015; Oei et al., 2020; Pollin, 2019).
Governments could lose tax and other revenue from plunging sales of their domestic industries (not to be confused
with carbon price revenue reviewed in Section 5), especially, but not exclusively for fossil fuel exporters. For instance,
Malova and van der Ploeg (2017) calculate that low oil and gas demand, in line with a 2C scenario, would require the
Russian government to divert an additional 0.9% of GDP a year toward investments outside the fossil energy sector to
keep the fiscal stance sustainable.
Real incomes of households could shrink due to rising prices, in addition to loss of employment, and declining
return on investments. These costs apply unequally. As poor households spend a larger fraction of their incomes on
high-carbon products, a carbon tax would be regressive if implemented without countervailing redistribution. In such a
case, Fremstad and Paul (2019) estimate that US households in the poorest deciles would incur 50% more additional
costs as a fraction of their expenditure than households in the highest decile. Strict low-carbon building and appliance
regulations, while not “stranding,” may affect the value of residential housing unequally, and disproportionately impact
the financial position of households struggling to raise the capital for retrofitting existing houses (Brown, Sorrell, &
Kivimaa, 2019; Cabrera Serrenho, Drewniok, Dunant, & Allwood, 2019; Schleich, 2019). Since poorer households are at
a higher risk of defaulting on loans, such regressive impacts can create further risks for the financial sector.
4.3 | Financial impacts
Drivers impact the financial sector (Figure 1, box 3) directly via changing expectations about transition costs and rules
(arrow B), and indirectly via transition costs (arrow C). There are two principal impacts: credit and market risks. First,
the loss of assets and income increases the likelihood of default on debt; therefore, banks could see their share of non-
performing loans grow. Higher ratios of nonperforming loans could in turn reduce the profitability of the lending bank,
affect its market valuation, and, if the phenomenon is significant enough, lead to a bank run and its default
(Dafermos & Nikolaidi, 2019b; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). The magnitude of this effect depends on how exposed the
banking system is to industries that will have to decline as part of the low-carbon transition (see Vermeulen et al. (2019)
and Giuzio et al. (2019) for data concerning Dutch and eurozone banks).
Second, institutional investors and other institutions holding financial assets could suffer negative portfolio effects
due to the revaluation of assets triggered by the transition process (Campiglio, Monnin, & von Jagow, 2019). Transition
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costs, or expectations thereof, could induce financial analysts to revise the expected discounted cashflow that carbon-
intensive firms will offer in the future, thus leading to a reduction in the current value of financial assets.10 The revalua-
tion could also take place “endogenously”, as a result of the application of new valuation models by financial analysts.
Whoever holds the devalued financial assets will see their wealth diminished. Economic theory is gradually incorporat-
ing transition-related risks into both growth and asset pricing theory (van der Ploeg & Rezai, 2020), and precise numeri-
cal estimates for specific investors are being estimated (e.g., Monasterolo, Zheng, & Battiston, 2018).
The impact on private financial markets could go well beyond the direct exposure of investors to carbon-
intensive sectors, due to financial contagion (Allen & Gale, 2000). Financial systems have featured deeply con-
nected networks throughout history (Graeber, 2011), and international financial liberalization since the 1970s has
only reinforced this interconnectedness (Christophers, 2013). Besides being exposed to the same stranded assets,
financial institutions also tend to be heavily exposed to each other (Battiston, Puliga, Kaushik, Tasca, &
Caldarelli, 2012). In particular, many financial assets are used as collateral in short-term repurchase agreements
(repos), so any decline in asset prices can cause liquidity problems. This means that a financial institution could be
strongly negatively affected by the low-carbon transition even if not directly exposed to carbon-intensive sectors by
“second-round effects” (Battiston, Mandel, Monasterolo, Schütze, & Visentin, 2017). A further decline of asset
prices could occur due to fire sales; episodes in which too many companies simultaneously sell off assets to try to
pay off excessive debt and avoid bankruptcy. This could prompt a vicious cycle of asset price falls and sell-outs,
known as debt-deflation (Fisher, 1932).
The overall effect of such revaluations of financial assets remains unclear, but is being addressed by a nascent
research literature published mostly outside of, or in collaboration with, academia (e.g., HSBC, 2019; Mercer, 2019;
UNEP FI, 2019). Two types of analytical approaches are employed (Campiglio, Monnin, & von Jagow, 2019). First, stud-
ies looking at the long term usually project transition scenarios to the future, derive sectoral economic gains/costs, and
transform them into changes in financial asset prices. This approach is implicitly based on the representation of the
low-carbon transition as a relatively smooth process of reallocation of resources from certain sectors to others, with
financial investors placidly following. However, financial sector dynamics are often characterized by sudden changes of
“sentiments” leading to unexpected volatility of prices. PRA (2018) calls the eventuality of fluctuations of the investor
sentiments concerning the likelihood of future transition scenarios a “climate Minsky moment”.11 To grasp these
effects, a second research approach uses the “stress testing” conceptual framework to analyze the reaction of asset
prices to certain types of shocks (e.g., a change in consumer preferences) and the effect of these changes on the portfo-
lios of financial institutions (Vermeulen et al., 2019).
Sanguine expectations about returns in sunrise sectors (operating mainly via arrow B) could in principle
lower the financial sector repercussions just described as more investors are hedging their exposure to high-
carbon assets with investments in lower-carbon alternatives (Andersson, Bolton, & Samama, 2016; Engle, Giglio,
Kelly, Lee, & Stroebel, 2020). However, as we have seen in Section 2, it might also be possible—at least in the
medium term—that a “mania” about low-carbon risks ultimately destabilizes the financial system. Moreover,
the bigger the low-carbon sector is, the more credible the threat that production patterns could quickly switch
away from high-carbon sectors. How important hedging could be for transition risks, and how soon low-carbon
sectors could become widespread objects of speculation is hard to say, and finance journals have only recently
started to pay attention to this problem (Diaz-Rainey, Robertson, & Wilson, 2017; Hong, Karolyi, &
Scheinkman, 2020).
Table 1 summarizes outputs from the few academic and a selection of central bank studies that report exposure of
banks to high-carbon sectors (rows 1, 2), and stress tests in the sense that 2nd round effects are traced (3) and feedback to
the economy is considered (4). The last two rows show value at risk, and a scenario study for physical risks, that is, from
climate change itself. The studies cannot be directly compared, as they use various system boundaries. But it is clear that
only looking at direct exposure (1, 2) gives much lower values than when tracing second-round effects (3, 4).
4.4 | Macroeconomic impacts
Transition costs and financial impacts could each cause macroeconomic impacts (Figure 1, box 4 via arrows D and E)
that reduce aggregate demand. We highlight some of the possible channels.
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4.4.1 | Banking channel
The increase in nonperforming loans could lead to credit rationing by commercial banks. Even if the origin of the shock lies
in carbon-intensive sectors, credit rationing could affect all sectors irrespective of their carbon intensity. This might translate
into higher interest rates, or a quantitative rationing of credit, which could in turn lead to a drop in investment levels of both
firms (new capital assets), households (new real estate), and governments (new public capital assets and infrastructure).
4.4.2 | Confidence channel
In addition to having limited access to credit, firms might have less appetite for investments if the transition has led to
a drop in their market valuation depressing confidence and expectations. Behind this lies “Tobin's q” theory, which sug-
gests that a low market capitalization to book value ratio lowers investments.12 If the crisis affects the entire economy,
these effects may also reduce investment in low-carbon sectors, as uncertainty raises the option value of waiting
(Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).
4.4.3 | Consumption channel
Reduced income from unemployment and reduced wealth from revaluations of assets held for example, via pension
funds, could shrink household consumption levels. Widening income and wealth inequality in combination with stron-
ger credit rationing may additionally impact consumption expenditure negatively, due to higher propensities to con-
sume and inability to smooth consumption of poorer households (Amromin, De Nardi, & Schulze, 2018; Fisher,
Johnson, Latner, & Smeeding, 2019).
TABLE 1 Estimates of potential maximal financial exposure to transition risks, and comparison with physical impact estimates
# Study Region and Channel
Scenario (with value in
parentheses as a share of
regional GDP)
1 Giuzio et al. (2019) First round exposure of 40 European
banks
Exposure to 20 largest emitting firms
amounts to 1.8% of 40 banks’ assets
(—)
2 Nieto (2019) Outstanding syndicated loans in China,
Europe, Japan, Switzerland, and the
USA to high environmental risk
Outstanding loans amount to 1.6
trillion 2014 USD (3.1% of GDP of
selected countries)
3 Battiston et al. (2017) First- and second-round exposure of top
50 EU banks to high-carbon assets
100% loss of fossil fuel & utility sector
portfolio wipes out 13.5% of top 50
banks’ equity (32.7% of European
Union GDP)
4 Vermeulen et al. (2018) First- and second-round impacts on
portfolios of 80 Dutch financial
institutions
Loss of up to 0.16 trillion 2018 EUR
when combining technology and
policy shocks (up to 18% of Dutch
GDP)
Physical risk studies for comparison
5 Dietz et al. (2016) Global assets at risk under DICE BAU
versus mitigation scenario
99th percentile of total assets at risk
amounts to 24.2 trillion 2013 USD
(31.5% of global GDP)
6 Lamperti, Bosetti, Roventini, and
Tavoni (2019)
Global bank failures from physical risks Additional government expenditure
needed to rescue banks (5–15% of
global GDP)
Note: Where possible, the comparison with GDP was calculated by using regional GDP figures in current national cur-
rency or USD from the IMF.
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4.4.4 | Public debt channel
Government expenditure is likely to initially react counter-cyclically to the reduction in other expenditure categories
due to automatic stabilizers, public support to failing industries, and not least through the bail-out of failing financial
institutions. However, higher public debt could translate into a lower capacity to spend in the future, especially in coun-
tries highly dependent on international credit markets.13 A worsening of sovereign credit ratings would also raise the
corporate cost of capital, as the two tend to be related (Kling, Lo, Murinde, & Volz, 2018; Kling, Volz, Murinde, &
Ayas, 2020).
4.4.5 | Other macroeconomic effects
Additional macroeconomic impacts could alter inflation rates, trade balances, and exchange rates, which in turn could
generate dynamics to re-assess existing international economic agreements (such as on trade) and propagate aggregate
demand reductions. The international spill-overs of financial instability can generate volatility in foreign investment
positions and exchange rates that can lead to follow-on debt crises, especially in developing countries. These impacts
are, at the moment, hard to quantify and - like all other effects - subject to stabilization efforts by governments at the
time of the crisis.
The combined effect of these impacts most likely decreases aggregate demand. This could in turn amplify transition
costs (arrow F) in all sectors and generate further financial impacts, in the worst case sending the economy into a
downward spiral of negative real-financial interactions with negative macroeconomic multipliers amplifying initial
losses. A credit crunch likely also affects financing for sunrise industry investments, and transition drivers (arrow G).
The only study that currently attempts to connect transition financial impacts with macroeconomic impacts is
Vermeulen et al. (2018), highlighting that most literature either examines structural change in the real economy, or
risks to financial stability but rarely both together. Financial sectors are also missing from integrated climate change
scenarios (Farmer, Hepburn, Mealy, & Teytelboym, 2015). However, many of the channels from finance to the real
economy and vice versa are explored widely in the macroeconomic literature, so any future modeling efforts can use
these as benchmarks.
4.5 | Two stylized scenarios
To better illustrate our theoretical framework, we conclude this section with two stylized scenarios using the concepts
and channels presented above. We distinguish between: (a) a smooth orderly transition; (b) a disruptive transition. Both
scenarios start from the same point. Renewable electricity and heat, low-emission transport, energy-efficient retrofits,
and other low-carbon products proliferate as relative prices tilt in their favor, driven by climate policies, technological
change, and changes in preferences and behavior.
A disruptive transition scenario could ensue if an ever-larger discrepancy arises between this direction of technolog-
ical trajectory and sunset industry investment. Firms continue developing fossil reserves, building pipelines, transfor-
mation plants, and internal combustion engine factories, possibly egged on by beliefs of oil demand rebound, that are
shared by a sufficient number of financial investors. These beliefs could in turn be supported by uneven and erratic cli-
mate policies, highly publicized low-carbon technological setbacks, vested interests bound up with at least a semblance
of “business as usual” in the high-carbon sectors and biased information as prominent forecasters and scenarios rein-
force shared beliefs. As large investments become sunk and committed, returns do not materialize due to tougher low-
carbon competition. Thus, persistently low fossil fuel prices and insufficient demand for high carbon products erode
cash flows and destabilize large balance sheets. Stock market valuations, still reflecting the belief of a high-carbon
future, become vulnerable to sudden changes in expectations.
Disorder could then be triggered by, for instance, a disruptive event affecting one of the transition drivers. This
could be a large-scale climatic event (e.g., unprecedented heat waves) that creates a generalized sense of urgency, lead-
ing to an “inevitable policy response” (PRI, 2020). This might take the form of a rapid and unanticipated increase in the
price on the carbon content of goods or highly restrictive regulation. Transition costs jump upwards and firms re-
evaluate their earnings prospect and write off assets. Banks re-assess the performance of their fossil-related loans and
write off substantial shares of their assets in turn. Equity investors may react faster, anticipating the market-woes, and
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jettison high-carbon firm financial investments, whereby market valuation collapses. At this point, the full chain of
events described in the previous subsections could play out.
A smooth transition avoids the divergence between the direction of investments and that of the transition drivers.
First, climate change mitigation policies are introduced gradually and at regular intervals with increasing degrees of
ambitions. Their implementation is announced with enough warning for economic agents to prepare appropriately.
They are backed by a large social and political majority, with low risk of policy reversal after changes in government.
Several institutions (government, central bank, financial regulators, and others) concur in creating a harmonized policy
effort, also across borders. Second, low-carbon technological progress continues at high speed but without major unan-
ticipated breakthroughs or setbacks, and this progress is well communicated (possibly with appropriate government
policies), so that market participants are aware of current technological trends and industry advancements. Third, con-
sumers gradually shift their preferences toward low-carbon goods and services. Finally, the wider socio-economic con-
text is also free of major disruptions (no wars, no pandemics, no disruptive climate-related physical impacts).
If these conditions are met, non-financial firms will recalibrate their new investments toward low-carbon technolo-
gies, while gradually phasing out existing high-carbon capital stock. Some firms will be less successful than others, but
widespread default is avoided with enough companies having diversified and transitioned into low-carbon industries.
Facilitated by firms' increasing climate risk disclosure and other financial sector regulations (see section 5), financial
institutions will also gradually reallocate their investments toward firms with a lower carbon intensity. The high-carbon
sector effectively manages its shrinking balance sheet, so that banks continue to receive interest payments until loans
are repaid. Insurance companies are spared from major transition-triggered disruptions. For these reasons, the full set
of transition impacts is never set in train.
These two scenarios bound a spectrum of transition scenarios of increasingly abrupt changes in expectations. Man-
aging a smooth yet successful transition will be difficult due to time constraints, as currently existing and planned capi-
tal stock is likely already capable of producing emissions beyond the 2C carbon budget. The challenge for policy-
makers will be to use the small window of opportunity to manage a controlled transition where both climate damage
and transition costs are minimized.
5 | POLICY RESPONSES TO MITIGATE FINANCIAL TRANSITION RISKS
While some policies drive the transition, others seek to reduce systemic financial impacts. Following the 2008 financial
crisis, central banks and financial supervisors have intensified efforts to strengthen financial regulation and identify sys-
temic financial risks in order to mitigate these. Central banks in particular were subject to a scrutinizing discourse on
their role in safeguarding financial stability, and their mandate more broadly (e.g., Dikau & Volz, 2020; G30, 2015;
Volz, 2017). Building on early academic contributions on the role of financial governance in addressing climate-related
financial risks (Campiglio, 2016; Volz, 2017), monetary and financial authorities have started to include climate change
among these systemic risks and consider adequate policy responses to mitigate them.14 Most attention has been devoted
to the risk of abrupt changes in asset valuations due to stranded assets. Hence, much of the discussion on policy
responses has centered around ways to mitigate sunset sector risk. Growing attention is now also being paid to impacts
on sovereign risks—stemming both from physical and transition risks—and how these can be mitigated (Battiston &
Monasterolo, 2019; Beirne, Rhenzi, & Volz, 2020; Buhr et al., 2018; Kling et al., 2018). There has also been a discussion
on the role of financial policies in scaling up investment in green activities, such as green supporting factors in financial
regulation or green asset purchases by central banks (e.g., Vaze, Meng, & Giuliani, 2019). This discourse has largely
ignored potential risks from rising industries.
Regulatory responses are mainly preventive in that they aim at providing information and incentivizing the move
away from high-carbon assets, so that any future transition driver has less impact. They include suggestions for enhanc-
ing transparency through taxonomies of “green” and “dirty” assets and a (mandatory) disclosure of risks (Thomä,
Dupré, & Hayne, 2018; Volz et al., 2015), climate-related stress testing at both micro and macro-prudential level
(Battiston et al., 2017), and climate calibrated capital rules or collateral frameworks.15 Initially, the focus was on a dis-
closure of financial risks from climate change, which would help firms to manage, and financial markets to price in
these risks and thus avoid rapid revaluation. In January 2016, the Financial Stability Board established a Task Force on
Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), which published recommendations on disclosures at the firm level
(TCFD, 2017). Risks that are thus disclosed can then be assessed under different scenarios of the future, and firms can
use these for risk management (Berg, Clapp, Lannoo, & Peters, 2018; TCFD, 2016). The financial sector is to use the
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disclosures for adequate pricing. There have also been proposals for introducing risk differentials in financial regula-
tion, that is, high-carbon penalizing or low-carbon supporting factors (Dafermos & Nikolaidi, 2019a).
The current thinking of policy makers is captured in the work of the Central Banks and Supervisors Network for
Greening the Financial System (NGFS), a group of 65 central banks and supervisors (as of July 2020), established at the
Paris One Planet Summit in December 2017. In April 2019, the NGFS (2019) put forward a high-level framework for
the integration of climate-related factors into prudential supervision, comprising five elements. According to this frame-
work, the first step is to raise awareness of climate-related risks and build capacity among firms to analyze their expo-
sure. The second step is the assessment of climate risks at both the micro- and macro-prudential level, that is, at the
level of individual financial institutions and the financial system as a whole. Examples include the assessment of finan-
cial institutions’ exposure to high-carbon sectors, or possible impacts of tightening energy efficiency regulation on the
valuation of energy inefficient homes. Climate-related stress tests could be conducted at the level of financial institu-
tions and of the system at large. The third step suggested by the NGFS is to provide guidance to regulated firms on
appropriate approaches to governance, strategy, and risk management to mitigate climate-related risks. Step four is
about climate-related disclosures to enhance transparency and promote market discipline. This may include an integra-
tion of climate-related disclosure requirements in line with the TCFD recommendations into Pillar 3 of the Basel III
banking regulations. The fifth and final step is to consider additional capital charges related to climate risks. This could
include an integration of climate-related capital surcharges into the minimum capital requirements under Pillar 1 of
the Basel III regulatory framework, or special capital requirements for firms that exhibit higher risk concentration in
their balance sheet or that do not comply with supervisory expectations under Pillar 2. The NGFS (2019, p. 6) empha-
sizes that climate change-related financial risks “are best mitigated through an early and orderly transition.”
Existing stabilization policy has been criticized by academic studies as inadequate. In particular, researchers
have criticized too strong a focus on disclosure and the expectation that it will lead to an “efficient market reac-
tion to climate change risks” (Carney, 2015, p. 12). For instance, Christophers (2017, p. 1124) contends that “there
is something fundamentally awry with expecting enhanced disclosure to miraculously provide financial systemic
safety.” Ameli, Drummond, Bisaro, Grubb, and Chenet (2019) argue, based on interviews with investors, that dis-
closure by itself is insufficient to change investment behavior, as the argument rests on the unrealistic efficient
market hypothesis (that financial markets price in all information). Monasterolo, Battiston, Janetos, and
Zheng (2017) note the difficulty of disclosing supply-chain carbon exposure. And disclosure may help re-classify
fossil fuel assets as junk, but does not make their associated systemic risk disappear (Mercure, 2019). More gener-
ally, the complexity of financial systems interlinkages limits the ability of regulators to address systemic risk
(Battiston, Caldarelli, May, Roukny, & Stiglitz, 2016), which can be exacerbated rather than mitigated by interna-
tionally integrated financial markets (Stiglitz, 2010). These sentiments are reflected in the IPCC's recent assess-
ment that effective mitigation would require an evolution of the global financial system (de Coninck et al., 2018).
Against this, some central bankers have, while acknowledging their role as financial regulators by enhancing
transparency and stress testing, insisted that central banks ought to adhere to the principle of market neutrality
in the conduct of monetary policy and not favor green over dirty assets (e.g., Weidmann, 2019). With reference to
the market neutrality principle, central banks have thus far also resisted calls for green quantitative easing, where
central bank asset purchases would be used to foster a green transition. In general, proposals for risk differentials
in financial regulation or collateral policies, and any activist policies aimed at fostering a green transition, have
been controversial (Dikau & Volz, 2019). Nevertheless, a growing number of central banks and supervisors have
started to implement micro- and macro-prudential measures to address transition risks (Dikau & Volz, 2020;
D'Orazio & Popoyan, 2019; Frisari, Gallardo, Nakano, Cárdenas, & Monnin, 2019) or are considering doing so,
going beyond disclosure and stress testing.
There is also a growing awareness of low-carbon transition risks among finance ministries.16 A Coalition of Finance
Ministers for Climate Action (CAPE) was established by 23 countries in April 2019 and has since grown to more than
50 members, all of which have signed the six “Helsinki Principles”, committing to national climate action and incorpo-
rating climate change into financial policies. While climate-related financial risks and impacts are included in the delib-
erations, to date the emphasis of CAPE has been primarily on fiscal policies.17
Finally, it is important to mention that appropriate redistributive and industrial policy can also reduce financial
risks indirectly by mitigating transition costs. For a budget-neutral example, consider how government revenue from
carbon taxes or auctioned-off emission permits could be used as a tool to mitigate transition costs for households. If part
of this revenue is redistributed among citizens, and since richer households consume more carbon and thus pay more
in absolute terms, feebates turn carbon prices into a progressive instrument (Boyce, 2018). Just transition policies could
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further mitigate impacts. Government revenue could also be used to maintain minimum company solvency during the
transition (Caldecott & Dericks, 2018), and industrial policy could direct (private and public) investments into sunrise
industries to help reduce the amount of assets at risk of stranding. One vehicle for this is via existing public develop-
ment banks seasoned in financing industrial policy that can strategically focus on structural change through their man-
dates and ability to function on lower operating margins than commercial lenders (Geddes, Schmidt, & Steffen, 2018;
Griffith-Jones & Ocampo, 2018; Mazzucato & Penna, 2016). Note, however, that loss of substantial revenues from
fossil-fuel royalties in major fossil-fuel producer countries could compromise the ability of those nations to support the
low-carbon transition through fiscal means.
6 | CONCLUSION
Low-carbon transition risks for finance arise from the abrupt structural change toward low-carbon industries that alters
expectations about future revenue streams in high-carbon industries. A comprehensive theoretical framework
explaining such sunset industry systemic risks for finance has hitherto been lacking because the theoretical and histori-
cal literature has tended to focus instead on historically more important risks from sunrise industries. Current academic
research into transition risks tends to address either the real-economy structural change, or the financial impact, but
does not typically connect the two. We contribute to the conceptual understanding of transition risks by developing a
consistent theoretical framework of the drivers, transmission channels, and impacts of the phase-out of carbon-
intensive industries on the financial system.
High-carbon industries could abruptly become uncompetitive due to a rapid change in climate-mitigation policy,
low-carbon technology or preferences, or a widespread change in expectations of their impacts. These transition drivers
cause physical assets to lose their ability to generate revenue, and if this is unanticipated, they become stranded. Asset
stranding combines with other transition costs, notably unemployment, losses in profits, and reductions in real incomes
from price changes that generate significant risks for portfolio losses and debt default. Financial actors might become
unable to service their own debt and obligations, creating loss propagation within the financial network. The adverse
impact of credit tightening and lack of confidence as well as the direct impact of transition costs on the macroeconomy,
could lead to a general economic crisis with further risks for finance. None of this suggests that financial markets would
be better off without or with a limited transition: delaying climate-change action would only necessitate an even more
rapid and potentially more damaging transition in the future, while exposure to physical risks under unmitigated cli-
mate change would be drastically increased. Targeted financial policies, however, can dampen some transition risks by
direct regulation of the financial sector.
What this article highlights is the need to understand in detail the transition risks for the macroeconomy and the
financial system. This calls for contributions from a number of different fields of research.
6.1 | Theory and History
We have tried in this article to start developing a conceptual framework, but more work would be welcome. Rich litera-
tures on business cycles and structural change already provide building blocks, some of which we reviewed in Section 2.
But they need to be connected. A clearer focus on the role of declining industries in triggering or exacerbating instabil-
ity would help root much of the discussion about stranded assets and financial risks in consistent theoretical frame-
works. Historical research with a lens on how declining sectors fared in downturns and may have contributed to
financial and economic crises could provide valuable insight and validation of theoretical frameworks. Moreover, it
would also be important to understand how—at least in the longer term—sunset and sunrise sector investments may
interact to either mitigate or exacerbate transition risks.
6.2 | Modeling
At the moment few, if any, modeling frameworks are capable of capturing the complexity of interactions described
above. Besides lack of theoretical connections, model assumptions (e.g., rational expectations, banks as pure intermedi-
aries), methods (e.g., no network analysis) and poor data access (most academics cannot afford access to proprietary
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financial databases, many of which in turn are not made for large data queries) complicate integration of all relevant
model components. Progress is being made on all of these fronts, and benefits from the bigger shift toward research on
financial instability following the Great Recession (Campiglio, Godin, Kemp-Benedict, & Matikainen, 2017), yet much
more effort is needed to integrate these strands.
6.3 | Institutions and governance
Research on the role of institutions and governance is in some ways most advanced thanks to the regulatory attention
that was reviewed in Section 5, and has stimulated attempts at modeling. Making progress in the other areas could in
turn generate useful insights on the appropriate regulatory roles and actions; ideally moving beyond a focus on disclo-
sure to investigate what “unconventional” measures might be conducive to smoothing the transition. Research could
also usefully elucidate how the varying institutional conditions in different parts of the world, and importantly in non-
high income countries influence transition risks and feasible policy responses.
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ENDNOTES
1 Cherp, Vinichenko, Jewell, Brutschin, and Sovacool (2018) show that for other purposes adopting a more multi-
disciplinary definition can be productive.
2 von Hayek (1931), like Marxist authors, only distinguishes consumption and capital goods sectors.
3 Reinert (2002) and Hagemann (2003) discuss theoretical influences on Schumpeter's thinking.
4 Note the parallels with the Marxist social structure of accumulation and regulation theories as a crisis being the turn-
ing point in the transition between two forms of capitalism (Kotz, 1990).
5 Discussions of green bubbles have to date taken place mainly outside academia, for example, in central banking cir-
cles (Regelink, Reinders, Vleeschhouwer, & van de Wiel, 2017). If anything, academic research has considered the
reverse direction of causation, how the recent financial crisis has either slowed the progress of the green transition
(Falcone, Morone, & Sica, 2018; Geels, 2013) or accelerated it through subsequently low interest rates that lowered
the costs of capital intensive low-carbon power generation (Schmidt et al., 2019).
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6 This effect cuts both ways. While “Fridays for Future” and “Extinction Rebellion” protests that started in 2019 may make
stringent policy more feasible (Horton, 2019), protests may also constrain the rollout of climate policy (Jewell &
Cherp, 2020).
7 In a rational expectations framework, stranded assets occur under policy time-inconsistency (Kalkuhl, Steckel, &
Edenhofer, 2019).
8 Note that the extent to which this increases cumulative emissions relative to a world without a carbon price and so
causes a situation termed the “green paradox” is subject to model assumptions, and existing empirical evidence tends
to refute it (Jensen, Mohlin, Pittel, & Sterner, 2015).
9 Research supported by the fossil fuel producer Shell suggests the deployment of carbon capture and storage could
allow significantly more reserves being exploited while respecting the carbon budget (Budinis, Krevor, Dowell, Bran-
don, & Hawkes, 2018).
10 The extent of current mis-valuation is contested. Byrd and Cooperman (2018) argue coal asset stranding is already
priced into investors’ expectations, while Silver (2017) avers that stranded asset risk is invisible to institutional inves-
tors. Griffin, Jaffe, Lont, and Dominguez-Faus (2015) discuss reasons for the lack of response of investors to news
about impending stranded assets, and Sen and von Schickfus (2020) suggest high-carbon firms expect compensation
for anticipated stranding. Christophers (2019) reports and analyses investors’ views.
11 The timing of the change in expectations is contingent on the drivers, but the 2020s were highlighted as the most
likely period in which the carbon bubble may burst and carbon risks materialize (Tracker & UNPRI, 2018; Bond,
2018). Scenarios charting pathways to meet the Paris targets also see global fossil fuel demand peaking in the 2020s
(Rogelj et al., 2018).
12 The original theory is subject to qualifications (Altissimo et al., 2005; Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2014).
13 The problem of crowding-out would seem less relevant as a crisis-ridden and transforming economy is likely to be far
from full capacity (Deleidi, Mazzucato, & Semieniuk, 2020).
14 See, for instance, Batten, Sowerbutts, and Tanaka (2016), ESRB (2016), Finansinspektionen (2016), Regelink,
Reinders, Vleeschhouwer, and van de Wiel (2017), PRA (2018), and NGFS (2019).
15 For an overview of policy tools available to central banks and supervisors see Dikau and Volz (2019).
16 The French Ministry of Finance was among the first to address climate risk for the financial sector. Enacted in
August 2015, Article 173 of the French Energy Transition Act introduced mandatory reporting requirements on
climate-related financial risks and the measures adopted to mitigate them for listed companies and/or large non-
listed firms, including both non-financial and financial firms (Direction Générale du Trésor, 2015).
17 Helsinki Principle 5 (“Mobilize private sources of climate finance by facilitating investments and the development of
a financial sector which supports climate mitigation and adaptation”) includes the identification of “strategies to
incorporate climate risks and opportunities into investment decisions, such as supporting global efforts for transpar-
ency and disclosure of climate-related financial risks and impacts, identifying risks to financial stability posed by cli-
mate change, and considering ways to manage these risks” (CAPE, 2019, p. 3).
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